New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX have emerged which secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this paper, we study the cryptographic routines from OpenSSL and Libgcrypt and measure the channel capacity in the context of such an enclaved execution. We demonstrate that the page fault side-channel is powerful enough to extract bits of encryption keys used in implementations of cryptographic routines -33% on average and 100% leakage in best case. We show that the previously conjectured defenses do not work against these attacks. To mitigate this, our first defense masks the page fault channel by determinising the program's memory access behavior. This defense is implemented purely in software and has a significant overhead of upto 4000×, but with our optimizations is reduce to 31.85%. As a second approach we propose contractual execution. With a small change to the hardware, this defense incurs a performance overhead of 6.77% on average.
INTRODUCTION
Operating systems are designed to execute at higher privileges than applications on commodity systems. Recently, this model of assuming a trusted OS has come under question, with the rise of vulnerabilities targeting privileged software [20] . Consequently, new hardware primitives have emerged to safeguard applications from untrusted OSes [35, 36, 46] . One such primitive is Intel SGX's enclaved execution which supports secure execution of sensitive applications on an untrusted OS. The hardware guarantees that all the application memory is secured with encryption when the OS accesses memory. However, during the enclaved execution, applications rely on the OS for memory management, scheduling and other system services. Currently, it is unclear whether and how the hardware or hypervisor mechanisms can ensure the correctness of these services [39] . It is important to understand the limitations of these systems as they are basis of primitives such as Intel SGX. Iago attacks are one such example where despite of enclaved execution, a malicious OS tampers the system call return values to disrupt the execution of an enclaved applications [12] . Another problem, discovered very recently is the information leakage via page fault side-channel [49] . Since the OS manages the application memory, it can observe all page faults and the faulting addresses, which can leak information about secret inputs of the sensitive user-level process. These attacks show that merely encrypting the memory to defend against the OS is not enough, which motivates a systematic study of these attacks and defense solutions.
In this paper, we study the channel capacity of the recently disclosed page-fault channel for enclaved execution systems. We analyze popular implementations of cryptographic routines (OpenSSL and Libgcrypt), which have not been studied in prior work. Cryptographic routines are vital to reducing the TCB and enclaved applications are expected to critically rely on them to establish secure channel with the I / O, filesystem and network sub-systems [7, 23, 41] . To perform an attack, the adversarial OS allocates a minimum number of physical pages to the sensitive enclave process, such that memory accesses spill out of the allocated set as much as possible, incurring page faults. We call such attacks as pigeonhole attacks which force the victim process to spill outside the allocated physical pages, thereby maximizing the channel capacity of the observed side-channel. Our results demonstrate that pigeonhole attacks are powerful enough to extract encryption keys used in cryptographic implementations -33% on average and 100% leakage in best case. Note that these attacks work even for implementations which are hardened against timing and cache side-channel attacks. They affect a long line of previous and emerging systems such as Intel SGX [36] , InkTag [24] , PodArch [43] , and OverShadow [13] which use memory encryption for protecting applications.
The page fault channel is much easier for the OS to exploit as compared to other side-channels. For example, in case of cache side-channel, the hardware resources such as size, number of data entries, scheduling algorithm and so on are often fixed. The adversary has a very limited control on these factors and the observations are mainly local to small fragments of program logic. On the contrary, in case of pigeonhole attacks, adversary is much stronger, adaptive, and controls the underlying physical resource (the number of physical pages). Moreover, it can make far more granular clock measurements (both global and local) by invoking and intercepting the enclave. To defend applications against this unaddressed threat, we seek a security property that allows an application to execute on any input data while being agnostic to changes in the number of pages allocated. The property assures that the OS cannot glean any sensitive information by observing page faults. We call such a property as data-independent execution.
In this work, we propose defenses against pigeonhole attacks to achieve data-independent execution. We point out that defenses against time and cache side-channels are not sufficient to prevent pigeonhole attacks, and achieving data-independent execution has been an open problem [49] . Specifically, we show why simple approaches such as self-paging, randomization, and masking timing side-channel briefly conjectured in previous papers are insufficient [49] . Our goal is to guarantee that even if the OS observes the page faults, it cannot distinguish the enclaved execution under any two inputs. We propose two concrete strategies to achieve this. Our first approach is called deterministic multiplexing, wherein the enclave application exhibits the same page fault pattern under all inputs. Specifically, we modify the program to proactively access all its input-dependent data and code pages in the same sequence irrespective of the input. Masking data page accesses is empirically much easier as compared to code pages. This is because sequence of code access has an innate notion of execution time. Determinising the time difference between the code-page faults is both challenging as well as costly in terms of performance. In our case studies, the naive implementation of deterministic multiplexing results in an overhead of about 504× on an average and maximum 4000×! Therefore, we devise optimizations techniques which exploit the program behavior and makes the overhead statistically insignificant in 6 cases, while the worst-case performance is still 31.85%. As an alternative, we propose a final performance-efficient scheme called contractual execution. The insight we use is that rather than a costly proactive defense, we add hardware support so that the enclave can detect pigeonhole attacks. The key challenge in contractual execution is to safely terminate the enclave post-detection as the point of termination may leak information. We address this challenge and our final scheme results in an acceptable overhead of 6.77% in benign execution and terminates safely if it detects a malicious OS. Results. We analyze two most popular cryptographic implementation libraries -OpenSSL [3] and Libgcrypt [2] using our semiautomated pigeonhole attack detection framework. Of the 24 routines we analyzed, 10 of them are vulnerable to pigeonhole attacks. The information leakage in these applications varies from 1.5% to 100% of all bits of secret input, thus highlighting the impact of pigeonhole attacks in cryptographic routines. We manually patch all the applications using both of our approaches and rerun the analysis to verify that pigeonhole attack is eliminated. Our patch sizes range from 4-120 LOC and required 3 hours of manual time for fixing per case on an average. Our goal is not to build an automation tool, though our mechanism can be automated in future. Contributions. We make the following contributions:
• Pigeonhole attacks. We study pigeonhole attacks which maximize the page fault channel capacity of information leakage in enclaved systems. Further, we demonstrate their efficacy on widely used cryptographic implementations. • Data-independent execution. We design two approaches: deterministic multiplexing and contractual execution that eliminate information leakage via page fault channel. In doing so, we recommend a fix to Intel SGX design so as to support data-independent execution with minimum overhead. • Optimizations & System Evaluation. We apply our defenses to the vulnerable cryptographic utilities from Libgcrypt and OpenSSL, and devise sound optimizations. In our experiments, deterministic multiplexing amounts to an average of 504× overhead without optimization, and is reduced to acceptable 10% average (31.85% worst-case) after optimization. Our contractual execution defense incurs an overhead of 6.77% on average, with nearly zero overhead in 2 cases.
Pigeonhole attacks
In a non-enclaved environment, the OS is responsible for managing the process memory. Specifically, when launching the process, the OS creates the page tables and populates empty entries for virtual addresses specified in the application binary. When a process begins its execution, none of its virtual pages are mapped to the physical memory. When the process tries to access a virtual address, the CPU incurs a page fault. The CPU reports information such as the faulting address, type of page access, and so on to the OS on the behalf of the faulting process, and the OS swaps in the content from the disk. Similarly, the OS deletes the virtual to physical mappings when it reclaims the process physical memory from the address space as and when requested or when necessary. Thus, a benign OS makes sure that the process has sufficient memory for execution, typically, at least 20 pages in Linux systems. Benign Enclaved Execution. The aim of enclave-like systems is to safeguard all the sensitive process (called as an enclave) memory during the execution. These systems use memory encryption to preserve the confidentiality of the sensitive content. The process memory is cloaked with encryption such that the hardware only decrypts the content in ring-3 when a legitimate owner process requests to access its content [13] . When the OS in ring-0 or any other process in ring-3 tries to access the memory, the hardware encrypts the content on-demand. This guarantees that neither the OS nor other malicious processes can access the physical memory of an enclave in decrypted form. In enclaved execution, the OS memory management functions are unchanged. The onus still lies with the OS to decide which process gets how much physical memory, and which pages should be loaded at which addresses to maintain the process-OS semantics. The OS controls the page table entries and is also notified on a page fault. This CPU design allows the OS to transparently do its management over cloaked memory while the hardware preserves the confidentiality and integrity of the process memory content. For example in SGX, if there are not many concurrent processes executing, the OS may scale up the memory allocation to a process (using ENCLS[EADD] SGX instruction). Later, the OS may decrease the process memory when it becomes loaded with memory requests from other processes (using ENCLS[EREMOVE] SGX instruction). The OS can also read and write process pages to continue support for demand paging and copy-on-write. Further, the CPU reports all the interrupts (such as page fault, general protection fault) directly to the OS. Figure 1 shows the scenario in enclaved execution, wherein the untrusted OS can access encrypted process memory via 4 interfaces: read, write, allocate, and de-allocate.
Many systems guarantee secure execution of processes in presence of untrusted OSes, either at the hardware or software level. Execution of processes in such isolated environments is referred to as cloaked execution [13] , enclaved execution [36] , shielded execution [7] , and so on depending on the underlying system. For simplicity, we refer to all of them as enclaved execution in this paper, since their underlying mechanism is the same as described above. Pigeonhole attack via Page Fault Side-channel. In enclaved execution, the OS sees all the virtual addresses where the process faults 1 . This forms the primary basis of the page fault side-channel. Each page fault in the enclaved execution leaks the information that the process is accessing a specific page at a specific point in execution time. Since the OS knows the internal structure of the program such as the layout of the binary, mmap-ed pages, stack, heap, library addresses and so on, the OS can profile the execution of the program and observe the page fault pattern. In fact it can invoke and execute the enclave application for all possible inputs in offline mode to record the corresponding page fault patterns. At runtime, the OS can observe the page fault pattern for the user input and map it to its pre-computed database, thus learning the sensitive input. The question that remains is -what degree of control does the OS have on the channel capacity?
An adversarial OS that is actively misusing this side-channel always aims to maximize the page faults and extract information from all possible page faults for a given input. On the upside, applications often follow temporal and spatial locality of reference and thus do not incur many page faults during execution. Thus, the information leaked via the benign page faults from the enclave is not significant. However, note that the adversarial OS controls the process page tables and controls which virtual pages are to be loaded in the physical memory at a given point. To perpetrate the pigeonhole attack, the OS allocates only three pages at most to the program at a particular moment -the code page, the source address and the destination address. 2 Lets call this as a pigeonhole set. Thus, any subsequent instructions that access any other page (either code or data) will fall out of the pigeonholed memory resulting in a page fault. 3 The faulting address of this instruction reveals what the process is trying to access. In most applications, a large fraction of memory accesses patterns are defined by the input. To extract the information about this input, the OS can pre-empt the process by inducing a page fault on nearly every instruction. Our analysis shows that empirically, every 10th code / data access crosses page boundaries on an average in standard Linux binaries 4 . This implies that the OS can single step the enclaved execution at the granularity 10 instructions to make observations about the virtual address access patterns. Thus, by resorting to this extremity the OS achieves the maximum leakage possible via the page fault channel.
Problem Statement
We study the amount of information the OS learns about the enclaved execution via the page fault channel alone. Lets represent an enclave program E that computes on input I to produce output O as (E, I) → O, such that both I and O are secret. In case of enclaved execution, the adversary A can see (E, I ) → O where I and O are encryption of I and O respectively. In our threat model, the adversary A can observe all the page faults as well as the time elapsed between two page faults. We term this knowledge of the adversary as the page access profile. This observed profile is specific to an input to the program.
Definition (Page Access Profile.) For a given program E and an single input I such that (E, I) → O, page access profile −→ P F is defined as a vector of tuples (Pn, Tn), where Pn and Tn is the virtual page number and time spent on the page respectively.
The attacker can observe the following four sub-channels from the page access profile:
• SC1: Number of page faults. Number of tuples in −→ P F reveals the total number of page faults incurred for an input. 
Attack Examples
A pigeonhole attack can manifest in any generic application running in an enclaved environment. In this work, we limit our study to cryptographic implementations for two reasons. First, even a minimalistic enclave will at least execute these routines for network handshake, session establishment and so on. For example, SGX applications such as OTP generators, secure ERM, secure video conferencing, etc. use an enclave for the TLS connections and other cryptographic functions on sensitive data [23] . Second, the previous work does not study the leakage via page faults in cryptographic routines since they are assumed to be already hardened against other side-channel attacks such as timing and power consumption. On the contrary, we show that inspite of such hardening and memory encryption in enclaved execution, the OS can completely or partially extract the sensitive inputs using pigeonhole attacks. Let us take a look at two representative examples to demonstrate the actual methodology to use pigeonhole attacks. Input Dependent Data Page Access. We choose a real example of AES from the latest Libgcrypt v1.6.3 compiled with gcc v4.8.2 on Linux system. In this example, the adversary can learn 25 bits of the input secret key. Note that the best known purely cryptanalytic attack for AES leak about 2-3 bits of information about the key [9] . Any leakage beyond that is a serious amount of leakage. A typical AES encryption routine involves multiple S-Box lookups. This step is used to map an input index to a non-linear value, followed by the MixColumn step [16, 19] . In the Libgcrypt implementation of AES, the lookup tables are designed to contain both S-box values as well as pre-computed values for MixColumns transform for optimization [2] . There are four such tables (T able0 to T able3) which are used in table look-ups at various rounds of encryption process. All the lookup operations in the first round take in a byte of the secret input key, XOR it with the message (which can be set to 0s) and emit a corresponding value in the table. Each of these tables comprise of 256 entries and are statically loaded based on the compiler-generated layout. In our example, T able1 and T able3 cross page boundaries. Specifically, indexes below 0x1C are in first page (P1) while the indexes from 0x1C to 0xFF are in second page (P2). Figure 3 shows the snapshot of the virtual address space of AES, where T able1 is loaded. During an enclaved execu- tion, the process will exhibit page access profile depending on the input secret key. For example, if the key is 0x1A3E0946, then the page access profile will be [P1P2P1P2]. An adversarial OS observing these page faults knows if the enclave is accessing page P1 or P2. Thus, for each access, this information reduces the OSes uncertainty from 256 choices to either 28 or 228 choices. In case of AES, these two portions of the table are accessed 4 times each in every round for a 128 / 196 / 256-bit key. The OS can adaptively execute the process and observe the access page access profile across multiple runs. This amounts to a leakage of 25 bits in just the first of the total 10 / 12 / 14 rounds of AES. Input Dependent Code Page Access. As a second example, consider EdDSA which is an elliptic curve signarure scheme with twisted Edward curve and is used in GnuPG and SSL. In EdDSA signing algorithm [8] , the main ingredient is a randomly chosen scalar value r which forms the session key. The value of r is private and if leaked it can be used to forge a signature for any arbitrary message. We show how the adversary can use pigeonhole attacks to completely leak the private value r. Figure 4 shows a code snippet and the page layout for the scalar point multiplication routine of Libgcrypt implementation compiled with gcc v4.8.2. It takes in an integer scalar (r in this case), a point (G), and sets the result to the resulting point. The multiplication is implemented by repeated addition -for each bit in the scalar, the routine checks the value and decides if it needs to perform an addition or not. The main routine (ec_mul), the sub-routines for duplication (dup_point) and testing the bit (test_bit) are located in three different pages denoted as P1, P2, P3. Interestingly, the addition sub-routine (add_points) is located in pages P1, P2. The OS can observe the page profiles within these three pages. A page profile satisfying a regular expression [P1 P2 P1 P3 P1 (P1P2) * ] implies a bit value 1 and [P1 P2 P1 P3 P1] implies a 0 bit value. Essentially, the OS can learn the exact value of the random integer scalar r picked by the process. This amounts to a total leakage of the process secret, and in fact enables the OS to forge signatures on the behalf of the enclave. Thus, the OS can observe input-dependent data and control transfers across pages, and infer cryptographic secrets. We demonstrate similar attacks in other cryptographic implementations of Libgcrypt and OpenSSL in Section 5 which are relevant to typical cloud settings -for example, in multi-tenant web servers and MapReduce platforms [7, 17, 41, 53, 54 ].
DEFENSE
In a program, an execution path is defined by the sequence of true and false branches taken at the conditional statements encountered during the execution. All such paths of a program can be represented using a tree, called the execution tree. For example, the function foo() in Figure 2 (a) has three execution paths, which form the execution tree shown in Figure 2 Definition (Execution Block.) A execution block B represented as (C, D), where C is an ordered set of all the code pages and D is the corresponding data pages accessed by each instruction in C.
It is simple to adapt the standard notion of basic blocks to our notion of execution blocks. In our example code snippet in Figure 2 (a), we have 6 such execution blocks BB1 to BB6. In case of BB1, the code page C will comprise of virtual page address of the statement z = 2 * y, and D will have virtual page address of variables z and y.
Definition (Execution Tree.) An execution tree T = V, E where each vertex V is an execution block connected by conditional edge E to form an execution tree.
Note that the execution tree in Figure 2 (b) is unbalanced, i.e., the depth of the tree is not constant for all possible paths in the program. This imbalance in itself leaks information about the input to an adversary even without pigeonhole attacks simply by observing the function start-to-end time. For example, the first path (path_a) in Figure 2 (b) is of depth 2 and is only taken when value of z equals value of x. If the adversary can try all possible values of secret, then the tree depth becomes an oracle to check if the guess is correct. To capture the information leaked strictly via the page fault channel, we limit our scope to balanced execution tree. If the tree is unbalanced, we assume that the program is converted to a balanced execution tree by adding dummy blocks as shown in Figure 2 (c) [37] .
Definition (Balanced Execution Tree.) Each program path has equal depth of execution blocks, and each execution block takes same amount of time to execute.
A program fragment with balanced execution tree depth of n, is such that each path in the program has n execution blocks. Techniques such as loop unrolling, block balancing, NOP padding can be used to balance the tree depth and block sizes [14] . In our experience, cryptographic routines which are hardened against timing and cache side-channels generally exhibit balanced execution trees. For the set of programs in our study, we perform a pre-preparation step to balance the execution tree explicitly. This may incur a cost which is orthogonal to our defenses for pigeonhole attacks.
Solution Setup
Note that even after a tree is balanced, the pigeonholing adversary knows the sequence of the basic blocks that were executed for a given input only by observing page faults. For example, lets assume that the basic blocks BB5 and BB6 are in two different pages P1 and P2 respectively. Then the result of the branching condition z < x + 10 will either cause a page fault for P1 or P2, revealing bit of information about the sensitive input x and y. Thus, given a balanced execution tree, our goal is to make all the programs paths independent of the input for the adversary [33] . Design Goals. We aim for the desired data-independent execution property, which has 4 sub-goals:
• G1. Enforce data-independent execution for all possible inputs for a given application. • G2. The guarantee should hold true even if the OS takes away all memory from the enclave. The adversary is permitted to dynamically change the underlying page allocations. • G3. The design should maintain consistency with the OSprocess semantics. For example, an enclave process should not be able to exhaust CPU resources and starve the OS. • G4. The performance overhead incurred due to the defense mechanism should be within an acceptable range.
Scope and Assumptions. In this work, we focus on safe-guarding the enclaved execution against pigeonhole attacks by guaranteeing data-independent execution. Following challenges are beyond the goals of this work.
• Our attacks and defenses are independent of other side-channels such as time, power consumption, caches. Application developers can deploy orthogonal defenses to prevent against these side-channels [52] . • Our defenses do not prevent information leakage via untrusted I / O, system-call, and filesystem channels [12] . • We assume that the time unit / CPU cycles for executing each instruction is the constant or can be made so using orthogonal techniques. This implies that each basic block takes approximately fixed amount of time to execute. • We assume that the program fragment execution takes the same time under all inputs i.e., the execution tree is balanced.
Insufficiency of Simple Approaches
Previous papers have briefly hypothesized that existing techniques to address oblivious execution and side-channel masking can be directly used to prevent leakage via page fault channel in enclaved execution [49] . We falsify this claim and show that the techniques are insufficient to defend against pigeonhole attacks. ORAM. Readers may notice that the main goal while achieving data-independent execution is to hide the page access profile such that the enclaved execution does not leak any information. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a generic defense useful for secure computation and works by making the data access patterns oblivious to the attacker [21, 45] . Intuition suggests that the enclave can use ORAM techniques to conceal its memory access pattern. In this case, when an adversary observes the physical storage locations accessed, the ORAM algorithm will ensure that the adversary has negligible probability of learning anything about the true (logical) access pattern. For our AES example, we can place the tables in an ORAM to randomize their ordering, such that the adversary cannot distinguish which offsets in the tables are accessed. However, ORAM involves continuous shuffling and re-encryption of the data after every access. This has two limitations in case of enclaves. First, the best known ORAM technique requires a constant private storage for shuffling the data blocks [32] . In case of pigeonhole attack, the enclave cannot guarantee more than just the code page from the OS at any point in time. This may not be sufficient to safely shuffle the data because the page access profile during the shuffling can leak the shuffled order. More importantly, the lookup operations dominate the computation in cryptographic implementations. For millions of accesses, the cost incurred for the shuffling is significant poly log (say over 1000×) and slows down the applications, which is not desirable [42] . Self-Paging. Instead of relying on the OS for page management, the enclaved execution can take the responsibility of managing its memory. Applications can implement self-paging to deal with its own memory faults using its own physical memory to store page tables [22] . In self-paging CPU design, all the paging operations are removed from the kernel; instead the kernel is simply responsible for dispatching fault notifications. Given a fixed amount of physical memory, the enclave can decide which virtual addresses are mapped to this memory, and which are swapped out. The problem with self-paging is -how can the enclave ensure that the OS has allocated physical pages to it? To guarantee this, the enclave should be able to pin certain physical memory pages, such that the OS cannot swap them out. This directly opens the possibility for a denial-of-service attack from the enclave, because it can refuse to give up the pinned pages. A hardware reset would be the only alternative to reclaim all the enclave pages, which is an undesirable consequence for the OS.
Another possibility is that the enclave performs self-paging without assuming fixed private physical memory. But this is unsafe, since the OS still controls how much memory to allocate to the enclave, retaining the ability to pigeonhole the memory pages. In both the above alternatives, there is a dilemma -should the enclave trust the OS and likewise. Hence, it is unclear how self-paging, with or without fixed physical memory, can defend against pigeonhole attacks. Our Solutions. We establish that both the techniques -ORAM and self-paging -which were previously conjectured as a defense against pigeonhole attacks cannot be used in a straightforward manner. The defenses for pigeonhole attacks are deceptively subtle to get right and demand careful security considerations. Next, we discuss our proposed solutions, the correctness and the trade-offs associated with them.
Solution I: Deterministic Multiplexing
Page access profile is inherently input dependent, so anyone who observes the page access profile can extract bits of information about the input. However, if the page access profile remains the same irrespective of the input, then the leakage via page fault channel will drop to zero [33, 48] . We call this strategy as determinising the page access profile. We adopt this strategy and enforce a deterministic page access profile for all possible paths in the balanced execution tree of the program execution. The enclaved execution always sequentially accesses all the code and data pages that can be used at a particular memory-bound instruction, irrespective of the input. Deterministic execution makes one real access and several fake accesses. We refer to such a execution as replicated-access execution.
The challenge that remains is: how to fake such an access while still doing the actual intended computations. We present a simple mechanism to achieve this. First we use the program's execution tree to identify what are all the code and data pages that can used at each level of the tree for all possible input. This gives us the set of pages for replicated-access. Thus, each access will be converted to sequentially access this entire set of pages accessible at specific level in the execution tree. Next, we use a multiplexing mechanism to load-and-execute the correct execution block. To achieve this, we break each execution of a code block into a load and an execute steps. In the load step, all the execution blocks at the same level in the execution tree are accessed sequentially. In the execute step the multiplexer will select the real block and execute it as-is. We now discuss specific strategies to multiplex code and data. Basic Multiplexing. In the load phase, we copy the code blocks at the same level to a temporary location namely code staging area (SA code ). All data that may be used by each of these sensitive code blocks is copied to a separate temporary location namely data staging area (SA data ). Then in the execution phase, we use an access multiplexer which selects the correct code and data blocks and does the real execution on it. At the end of the sensitive execution, the content from data staging area is then pushed back to the actual address. For values that are changed, the new values are updated while the rest of the values are just copied back unchanged. Since the execution is performed within the boundary of single code and single data page, the multiplexed load and execute mechanism ensures that the OS cannot determine which code and data block was actually used within the staging area. This guarantees data-independent execution. Example. For our AES case, we apply deterministic multiplexing and copy the corresponding data table T3 to staging area (See Figure 5 ). Each data access now incurs 2 data page copies and a code page copy followed by multiplexed accesses. Similarly for EdDSA, we can multiplex the copy operation of the callee functions into SA code (See Figure 6 ). This asserts that the OS cannot differentiate whether the true or the false branch was executed, by looking at the page access profile. Thus, in both the cases the OS can observe the load and execute operations only at the page granularity. It cannot determine which of the load or execution operations is real and which is replicated. Compacted Multiplexing. In the multiplexing mechanism, it is important that both SA code and SA data must fit in a single page each to prevent information leakage. For ensuring this, we specifically pick a block size such that at any given level in the execution tree, all the blocks and the corresponding data always fit in a single page. However, there are cases where the execution tree is deep and has large number of blocks (more than 4096 bytes) at a certain level. This results in a multi-page staging area. To address this, we use a compaction scheme and fit the staging area in a single page. Specifically, in the load phase, we determine which is the real block and always copy it to the staging area. For the rest of the blocks, we perform a smart copy such that each copy operation writes to the same location in the staging area. In this way, we compact all the non-execution blocks into a single block in staging area. Thus the staging area always fits in a single page. The OS can only observe at the granularity of a page (and not the offsets), hence this is safe. The semantics of the execute phase are unchanged.
Solution II: Simple Contractual Execution
Although deterministic multiplexing is a secure mechanism to address pigeonhole attacks, readers can see that determinising code execution incurs a significant overhead. Especially in cases where the set of fake pages that need to be accessed is large, each real access incurs significant overhead. To cater for performance-sensitive programs, we explore a cheaper technique.
We propose a technique wherein the enclave is guaranteed that certain virtual addresses will always be mapped to physical memory during its execution. The enclave application is coded optimistically assuming that the OS will always allocate specific number of physical pages to it while executing its sensitive code blocks. The enclave informs its memory requirements to the OS via a callback mechanism. These requirements act as a contract if the OS agrees, or else the OS can refuse to start execution of the enclave. The enclave states the set of virtual addresses explicitly to the OS before starting its sensitive computation. The CPU acts as a contract mediator and is responsible for enforcing this guarantee on the OS. We term such an execution as contractual execution. Note that as opposed to self-paging, the contract is not a hard guarantee i.e., the enclave cannot pin the pages in physical memory to launch a denial-of-service attack on the OS. In fact, the OS has the flexibility to take back pages as per its own scheduling policy. However, when the CPU observes that OS has deviated from the contracteither genuinely or by injecting random faults, it immediately reports the contract violation to the enclave. Contract Enforcement. In a traditional CPU as well as in original SGX specification [4] , all page faults are reported directly to the OS without the intervention of the faulting process. Thus, the process is unaware of its own page faults. This makes it impossible for the enclave to detect pigeonhole attacks. For contractual execution, the hardware needs to report its faults to the process instead, which calls for a change in the page fault semantics. A limited amount of support is already available for this in SGX. As per the new amendments in Revision 2, SGX can now notify an enclave about its page faults by setting the SECS.MISCSELECT.EXINFO bit [5, 7] . When an enclave faults, the SGX hardware notifies the enclave about the fault, along with the virtual address, type of fault, the permissions of the page, register context. It is the enclaves responsibility to decide whether to handle the fault or ignore it.
To implement contractual execution on SGX, we set the SGX configuration bit such that when there is a page fault, the enclave will be notified directly by the CPU. The benign OS is expected to respect the contract and never swap out the pages during the execution. However a malicious OS may swap out pages, in which case the CPU is responsible for reporting page faults for these pages to the enclave directly. Let us discuss next, what an enclave should do when it is notified of an unexpected fault (a contract violation). Naive Self-termination Strategy. What should the enclave do once it detects that it is under attack or a violation of the contract? A naive strategy is to immediately terminate the enclaved execution. Such deterministic self-termination by the enclave leaks the point of page fault to the OS, which leaks 1 bit of information per execution. Note that the OS can repeatedly invoke the vulnerable application, stealing different pages in each run and observing the different points of self-termination in each execution. Such an adaptive pigeonholing adversary learns significant informationin fact, with enough trials the OS learns the same amount of information by observing self-termination patterns as by observing page faulting patterns in a vanilla enclaved execution! For concrete illustration, consider the example of AES in which there are 4 input-dependent S-Box (table) lookup in each round. Let us consider the case of two secret inputs I1 and I2 such that execution under I1 never access a page P1 in all of its S-box lookups, while the execution under I2 accesses P1 during the 3rd S-box lookup. To distinguish between I1 and I2 in a contractual execution, the OS can steal the data page P1 before the 3rd S-box lookup and observes whether the enclave self-terminates abruptly. If it does, the OS can infer that the secret input is I2. Thus, abrupt termination serves as an oracle for the OS to distinguish between two inputs I1 and I2. Specifically, the OS observe two things in case of such termination: (a) the enclave was trying to access P1, (b) the index for 3rd lookup is less than 0x1c since it accessed P1. Hence, deterministic self-termination is not safe strategy.
Solution III: Safe Contractual Execution
To address the limitation of Solution II, we introduce the notion of a working set of pages. Each sensitive logic in the application defines a minimum set of physical pages that an enclave should have in the memory when executing it. We refer to this working set as a bucket, whose size is specified in the contract. We first analyze the program execution tree and identify all the code and data pages that are accessed at all the levels of the execution blocks. This defines the minimum required bucket size for a program. At the start of execution of a sensitive code area, the enclave initiates a contract and requests the OS to commit to allocate number of physical pages equal to the size of bucket (Step-1 in Figure 7 ). Once the bucket is loaded in memory, the enclave executes the program assuming that the contract is enforced.
In the event of a fault within a bucket, the CPU immediately vectors control to the enclave's page fault handler. It is the responsibility of the enclave page fault handler to safely terminate the enclave. As mentioned earlier, the enclave cannot self-terminate immediately when it detects that the bucketed page is missing. This may reveal that the enclave was accessing the page and hence a particular code branch / data in the path.
Our goal is to hide the following facts (a) whether the enclave incurred a page fault within the bucket, (b) if so, at which point in the execution tree did the fault occur. Once a contract violation is detected by the enclave, the enclave enters into what we call as fake execution mode. The fake execution mode is simply a spin-loop executed by the enclave page fault handler, which pads the execution time of the program until it reaches the end of the execution tree. In essence, the fake execution executes dummy blocks to mask the time of occurrence of the page-fault from the OS. To execute this strategy, the enclave page fault handler needs to know the time remaining (or elapsed) in the bucket execution. This information is kept in a dedicated register during the program execution, and is updated at the end of each block. The enclave page fault handler calculates the remaining time to execute till the end of the tree using the information in the dedicated register. Figure 7 shows the point at which the contract violation occurs (Step 2), the fake execution steps (Step 3), and the final termination (Step 4).
For such a defense to be secure, the execution of the enclave must be indistinguishable to the adversary, independent of its strategy to respect or violate the contract. Our described strategy achieves this goal. Consider three scenarios: (a) the OS obeys the contract, (b) the OS deviates from the contract resulting in one or more page faults, and (c) the OS deviates from the contract but no page faults result. Our defense ensures that all such three executions are indistinguishable from the adversary's perspective. The enclaves performs a real execution in scenario (a) and (c) and a fake execution only in (b). All real executions incurs no page fault in contractual execution -hence they are indistinguishable trivially. It remains to show that the fake execution is indistinguishable from a real execution. This is true because the fake execution masks all the four Algorithm 1 Libgcrypt modular exponentiation (powm).
INPUT: Three integers g, d and p where d1...dn is the binary representation of d. OUTPUT: a ≡ g d (mod p).
end while end procedure channels SC1-4 in Section 2. Specifically, the time taken (SC4) by the fake execution is the same as that by a real execution (as explained above). Further, since all page faults are redirected to the enclave, the OS does not see faults for the bucket pages, and does not learn the number of faults (SC1), the faulting addresses (SC2) and their sequence (SC3). This establishes that a fake execution is indistinguishable from the set of real executions.
One assumption in the proof-sketch above is that all faults indeed vector control back to the enclave, without the OS having the ability to force a termination when a fault occurs. This is an implementation step necessary for the contractual execution to work. We explain how to implement such a interrupt vector reliably next. Preventing Pigeonhole attack on enclave page fault handler. To ensure that the enclave page fault handler can execute our strategy outlined above, the hardware must guarantee a mechanism to vector control to a enclave page fault handler. The current SGX specifications have a mechanism to notify the enclave when there is a page fault, so that the enclave can implement its own page fault handler. However, it does not specify whether the hardware guarantees that the enclave's page fault handler code will be mapped in memory when the enclave is executing. If this guarantee is missing, then a fault on the enclave page fault handler will lead to a double-faultthe accessed page as well as the fault handler page are missing [43] . To mitigate this threat, the hardware must eliminate double-faults by design. Informing the OS about a double fault in unsafe, as it leaks the information that enclave page fault handler was invoked thereby making fake execution clearly distinguishable.
To prevent this leakage, we propose that the CPU allow the enclave to specify one virtual page in its contract to always be mapped during its execution. Specifically, the CPU checks if that this page is mapped whenever control enters the enclave (say in the start of enclave execution or subsequently after a context-switch). Note that our proposal for "pinning" a page is different from self-paging -in our defense, the OS is free to invalidate the contract by taking away the reserved page. This will result in the enclave being aborted as soon as the context switches to the enclave, whether or not the enclave accesses the reserved page. This abort strategy is thus independent of page accesses in the enclave, and at the same time, the enclave poses no risk of denial-of-service to the OS. We recommend this as an extension to enclave systems such as SGX.
OPTIMIZATIONS
A program with a balanced execution tree can be generically protected from pigeonhole attacks by applying either deterministic multiplexing or contractual execution. However, these protection mechanisms may incur a high performance cost if applied as-is. We propose a set of optimization strategies O1-O5 below.
Exploiting Data Locality
The main reason that input-dependent data accesses leak information in pigeonhole attacks is that the data being accessed is split across multiple pages. In all such cases, the deterministic multiplexing repetitively copies data to and fro between the staging area and the actual data locations. There are two key observations specific to these cases; leading to two optimizations. O1: Eliminating copy operations for read-only data. We observe that most of the table lookup operations are on pre-computed data and the code does not modify the table entries during the entire execution. Since these sensitive data blocks are used only in read operations, we can load them into SA data and discard them after the code block executes. This saves a copy-back operation per code block. Moreover, if the next code block in the execution tree uses the same data blocks which already exist in SA data , then we need not copy them to SA data . This save all the copy operations after the data is loaded into the SA data for the first time. In case of AES, we require only two operation to copy T able1 from P1 and P2 to SA data . We can apply the same strategy to T able3, so that the entire execution needs only four copy operations. O2: Page Realignment. All the data blocks which are spread across page boundaries (specifically, S-Boxes) can be grouped together and realigned at the start of the page. This ensures that the set of sensitive data pages is minimum for the entire execution. In the context of AES example, both T able1 and T able3 cross the page boundary and use 3 pages. After the optimization, they can be aligned to page boundary and fit in 2 pages. Thus for deterministic multiplexing, the patch incurs only two copy opertations in total. For contractual execution, the bucket size reduces from 3 to 2.
Exploiting Code Locality
In case of input-dependent control transfers, naively determinizing the control flow results in a high overhead. For example, in one of the case studies (powm), we find that the patched code is 4000× slower! To address this short-coming we propose a set of optimization strategies specific to the type of pigeonhole attacks, which reduces the overheads to an acceptable range. We take the example of powm and demonstrate our optimization strategies.
Algorithm 1 shows the code structure and data access pattern for the powm example. In the Libgcrypt implementation, the actual function body (powm), the multiplication function (mul_mod) and the table lookup function (set_cond) are located in three separate pages say P1, P2, P3 respectively. Hence, the leakage from powm is due to the different fault patterns generated from calls to mul_mod and set_cond functions. Let us consider the naive implementations of deterministic multiplexing to make calls to both these functions indistinguishable. For this, we generate the call graphs of both functions which identifies the set of sensitive functions that are to be masked. For each call to any of these sensitive function, we perform a multiplexing operation. It iterates over the the set of these sensitive functions in a deterministic manner and copies all the blocks to SA code . The multiplexer then selects the correct block and executes it. In case of powm, we move powm, mul_mod and set_cond to the staging area. This naive implementation of solution incurs an overhead of 4000×, which is unacceptable. We discuss our strategies in the context of this example to describe the reasoning for the optimization. O3: Level Merging. The dominating factor in the deterministic multiplexing is the number of copy and multiplexing operations at each level in the execution tree. We observe that by the virtue of code locality, code blocks across multiple levels can be merged together in a single level. Specifically, we place the code blocks such that the caller and callee function are contained within a page. This reduces the number of copy operations since both the blocks are already in the staging area. For example, consider 3 code blocks a, b, c located in three separate pages. The call graph is such that c is called by both a and b. If total size of a, b, c put together is less than a page (4096 bytes), then we can re-arrange the code such that all three of them fit in a single page. In terms of the execution tree, it means that we fold the sub-tree to a single code block. O3: Level Merging via Cloning. The above strategy will not work in cases where the code blocks in a sub-tree cannot fit in a single page. To address this, we use code replication i.e., we make copies of shared code block in multiple pages. In our example, if a, b, c cannot fit into a single page, we rearrange and replicate the block c in both P2 and P3. After replication, a control-flow to c from neither a nor b will incur a page fault. For powm, we split the mul_mod into 2 pages and replicate the code for set_cond. Thus, call to from powm to set_cond can be resolved with either of the pages. After applying this optimization to powm, we reduce the overhead from 4000× to 83×. O4: MUX Elimination. Our next optimization is based on the insight to eliminate the costly multiplexing operation by rearranging the code blocks. To achieve this, we place the code blocks in the virtual pages to form an execution tree so that all the transitions from one level to the other exhibit the same page fault. This eliminates the multiplexing step altogether. In the above example of a, b, c, we place a and b into one page and c into another. Thus, the control-flow from both a and b to c will incur a page fault. We can chain together such transitions for multiple levels in the tree, such that all the blocks in next level are always placed in a different pages. We specifically apply MUX eliminxation to the execution tree for mul_mod function in powm. This helps us to reduces the overhead from 4000× to 3.8% (see Section 6) .
We apply a local optimization which is specific to the nature of the sensitive code. Several other techniques from compliers can also be borrowed to reduce the number of multiplexing operations. We limit the discussion to strategy applicable in our case study. O5: Control-to-Data Dependency Transformation. Given that masking data page accesses is much easier than masking code page accesses, it will be useful if we can convert the input dependent code accesses to data accesses instead. For example, the if condition on value of c in Figure 4 .2 (a) can be rewritten as Figure 4.2 (b) . Specifically, we perform an ifconversion such that the code is always executed and the condition is used to decide whether to retain the results or discard them [15] . In the case of EdDSA, we first load the value of res into SA data (Refer to Figure 4 for code details). We execute add_points unconditionally and use test_bit as a selector to decide if the value in SA data is to be used. In the case where test_bit returns true, the actual res in SA data is used in the operation and is updated, else it is discarded. The page fault pattern will be deterministic since add_points will be executed on all iterations of the loop and the operand of the function is always from SA data . 
CASE STUDIES
We present our results from the study of a general purpose cryptographic library Libgcrypt v1.6.3 which is used in GnuPG and a SSL implementation library OpenSSL v1.0.2 [1-3]. Of the 24 routines we analyze in total from both the libraries, implementations of 10 routines are vulnerable to pigeonhole attacks and leak 33% of secret inputs on average (Refer to Table 1 for details). 
Input Dependent Code Page Access
EdDSA. In Section 2.2 we explained how the page fault pattern for scalar multiplication in EdDSA leaks value of r completely. To use EdDSA, the two parties first agree upon the public curve (or domain) parameters to be used. For message M , the signing algorithm outputs a tuple (R, S) as the signature. Specifically, the sender derives a session key r for M and uses with a private key a.
Here, the value of r is used in the scalar multiplication operation r × G, where G is the public elliptic curve point. In the verification step, the receiver checks if the <M , (R, S)> is a valid signature. If the adversary knows the value of r, he can easily forge signatures for any message M . powm. Modular exponentiation (also referred to as powm) is a basic operation to calculate g d mod p. It is used in many public-key cryptographic routines (for e.g., RSA, DSA, ElGamal). Specially during key generation, decryption and signing it involves a secret exponent (private key). Algorithm 3.5 shows the pseudocode of the powm in Libgcrypt v1.6.3. powm uses a sliding window tech-nique for exponentiation. This is essentially a m-ary exponentiation strategy which partitions the bits of the exponent into constant length windows. The algorithm then performs as many multiplications as there are nonzero words by sliding the window across the trailing zeros. The algorithm also pre-computes the results for all the positions in a window by mul_mod function. It then selects the correct result using set_cond . In the Libgcrypt implementation, the actual powm function body, the multiplication function and the selection function are located in three separate pages. By the virtue of this, the OS can clearly identify each call to a multiplication and a selection using the page access profile. Let us see the case when the window size W = 1. As the readers will observe, there are two multiplication operations: in the inner loop and in the outer loop as highlighted in Algorithm 3.5. In order to know the exact value of the secret exponent, it is important to identify in which loop a particular multiplication operation is invoked. If the adversary can distinguish each time the multiplication is invoked in the inner loop, it effectively tells the number of 0 bits that the execution shifted after a bit 1. To differentiate this the inner loop multiplication (a · a) from the outer loop multiplication (a · gu) the adversary uses the following strategy. It observes when gu is fetched from the precomputed table. To do this, the algorithm invokes a bit checking logic and matches the value of u with the corresponding value from the list of precomputed values. Since the logic for set_cond is located in a different page, by observing the page sequence, the attacker can group each individual multiplication to the loop it belongs to. This leaks all the bits (1 separated by string of 0s) in the exponent in a single execution. In general, for W > 1 the adversary needs approximately W R trials to extract the whole key, where R is the number of iterations in the outer loop.
Input Dependent Data Page Access
In our study we find that for 6 cases, the S-Boxes (or their variants) cross page boundaries thus leaking information. For brevity, we explain the steps to calculate the leakage via input-dependent table lookup operations for AES. We use similar calculations steps for the remaining 5 cases -CAST5, SEED, Stribog, Tiger and Whirlpool. AES. As discussed in Section 2.2, there are 4 S-Box tables in total each with 256 values, of which 2 are split across pages, For the first block of plain text, the routine directly uses the first 128 bits of cipher key in first round 5 . The initial uncertainty of the OS is 2 128 . With pigeonhole attack, the OS knows for 64 bits if the index is less than 0x1c because they are for lookups in vulnerable S-Boxes. Thus, the OS only needs to make 2 64 × 28 8 guesses. Thus, the information leakage (in bits) = log2(Initial Uncertainty -Remaining Uncertainty). log2(2 128 − (2 64 × 28 8 )) = 25.542 5 bits [44] . Thus, AES leaks 25 bits in first rounds for all key sizes 128, 192, 256. Similarly, SEED leaks 22 bits and CAST5 leaks 2 bits in both Libgcrypt and OpenSSL. For Libgcrypt, the cryptographic hash implementations Whirlpool, Stribog and Tiger leak 32, 32 and 4 bits of the input key respectively in Password-Based Key Derivation Function PBKDF2 (Table 1 ).
EVALUATION
Evaluation Goals. We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed solutions for following main goals:
• Does our defense apply to all of our case studies?
• What are the performance trade-offs of our two defenses? 5 We trun off the Intel AES-NI hardware acceleration in this case.
Platform. We conduct all our experiments on PODARCH [43] , a publicly available system which is similar to SGX. Our machine is a Dell Latitude 6430u host, configured with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-3687U 2.10GHz CPU, 8GB RAM. We configure PODARCH with one CPU, 2GB RAM and 64-bit Linux 3.2.53 Kernel on Debian Jessie for all the experiments. We use gcc v4.8.2 with the -O2 optimization flag for compiling our vanilla and patched case studies. All the results are averaged over five runs. For consistency, we set the native CPU scaling to performance mode.
Applicability
We apply our two defense techniques to each of the 8 crypto implementation outlined in Table 1 . We automate the analysis for identifying all code and data page accesses that are involved in the sensitive calculations, by obtaining page layout information from the GNU linker and /proc/maps. In several case studies, we require to determine the concrete addresses that pointers point to at runtime. We use the Pin binary instrumentation framework to intercept on such pointer accesses to determine their pointed-to objects using our Pintool. For applying the deterministic multiplexing defense, we manually transform the C implementations to introduce replicated accesses to data pages, and instrumented each basic block with a call to the code multiplexing logic as described in Section 3.3. We add pragmas to the source code to delineate execution blocks. The code-generation step in the compiler is directed by these pragmas to pad the execution block and ensure that any necessary instrumentation to track blocks or levels in the execution tree are inserted. We implement a linker pass to check the consistency of the final assembly code, and to relocate blocks into virtual pages as our defense needs. In case of contractual execution defense, the instrumentation effort is minimal. We manually identify the sensitive code and data pages as a single bucket and patch the application to declare the start and end of the bucket around the sensitive computation. We also write a custom enclave page fault handler for each of these applications to safely fake the execution and requires on an average 3 hours of development effort per case. Empirical Validation. Our applications are compiled into static binaries for testing. We run these executables on PODARCH [43] which is implemented on QEMU emulator, and only supports static linking. To implement our contractual execution defense, we add 43 LOC to PODARCH to support enclave page fault handler. To test our patched applications, we execute the standard regression testsuite available with the cryptographic libraries (make check). In addition, we evaluate the adversarial corner cases (outlined below) to test the correctness of the final executable. To empirically validate that our defenses work, we ensure the following tests on the patched executions: We simulate the following OS memory manager configurations for contractual execution in out tests:
• Benign. We ensure that the OS loads all the bucket pages before starting the sensitive execution. During the entire execution, the OS does not violate the contract / induce any page faults within the bucket. • Adversarial. We induce page faults within a bucket to simulate a malicious OS. We inject three types of page faults during the contractual execution to cover the three scenarios such that, the page removed is (a) accessed in the execution path, (b) not accessed in the execution path and (c) randomly selected. To inspect the correctness, we analyze the page fault access patterns in the transformed application using our PinTool that logs all instructions and memory accesses. We report that our deterministic multiplexing produces the same page access profile for all regression and test inputs, as checked with our PinTool. Column 8 in Table 2 reports the total number of page faults incurred in each application. For the contractual execution defense, the benign execution incurs no page faults, as shown in Column 4 in Table 2 . To check if the execution aborts safely when the OS induces a page fault, we compare the time taken by the fake execution and the set of real executions under normal inputs. Both the executions exhibit no statistically significant differences. Column 4-5 in Table 3 presents the average and the standard deviation execution time for the real execution, and Columns 6-8 for fake execution under 3 test inputs that stress the corner cases. This confirms that that our termination strategy is safe. Finally, we report that the enclave page fault handler is about 300 bytes, and fits within a single page of 4KB -therefore our proposed hardware change is sufficient to make contractual execution defense practical.
Performance Evaluation
Baseline. We run the unmodified Libgcrypt implementation on PODARCH and measure the execution time. This forms the baseline for all our performance measurements. All the binaries are statically linked since PODARCH does not support dynamic loading of shared libraries [43] . Column 2, 3 in Table 2 shows the number of page faults and the execution time for vanilla Libgcrypt code in PODARCH. To check that the overheads of our defenses are not an artifact of PODARCH, we also run our vanilla and modified binaries on native Intel CPU Intel Core i7-2600 CPU. We report that the overheads on a native CPU are similar to that on PODARCH and deviate only within a range of 1%. Performance Measurement. We consider only the sensitive code from the cryptographic implementations and measure the execution time for these.We calculate the overhead by comparing the baseline performance of unmodified code against the execution time of the patched applications. We use input patterns to represent the best, worst and average case executions of the application, specifically, inputs with (a) all 0s, (b) all 1s, (c) random number of 0s and 1s, and (d) all the regression tests from the builtin test-suite. Deterministic Multiplexing. The applications patched with the deterministic multiplexing technique incur the least overhead of 31.85% for EdDSA and maximum overhead of 4000× in case of powm (Column 12 and 14 in Table 2 ). To investigate the main sources of these overheads we measure the break-down for the load step and the execute step in deterministic multiplexing. We observe that the overhead is mainly dominated by the copying of data to and from the staging area in the load step (Column 10 and 13 in Table 2 ), and accounts for 64% out of the total overhead on average. We notice that the load step time is especially high for cases like Stribog and Tiger where it accounts for 93.9% and 91.93% of the overhead. Effectiveness of Optimization Techniques. We apply the optimization strategies discussed in Section 4 to experimentally validate and demonstrate their effectiveness. In the case of powm, O3 reduces the performance overhead from 4000× to 83×. With O4 we completely remove memory copying for code determinization which reduces the overhead from 83× to 3.87%. We apply optimization O1 to the 6 cases of input dependent data page access to reduce the number of copy operations. Further we also apply O2 to reorder the lookup table layout, such that that after the optimizations are in place, the execution incurs lower page faults. This reduces the overhead to 10.53% for deterministic multiplexing on an average. In fact, our patched version executes faster than the baseline code (as denoted by negative overhead in Column 18 in Table 2 ) for 5 cases. After manual inspection, this is explained because in the patched code, the lookup tables are pre-loaded in memory which reduces the total number of page faults incurred during the execution (Column 16 in Table 2 ). On the other hand, in the vanilla case these pages are loaded to memory at runtime which is a very costly operation. Thus, eliminating this cost results in a negative overhead. For EdDSA, we directly apply the peephole optimization O5 which transforms the input dependent code access to data access. This gives us an overhead of 31.85% for EdDSA. Contractual Execution. As compared to deterministic multiplexing, contractual execution incurs a lower overhead of on an 6.77% on an average and 27.25% in the worst case. (See column 4 and 7 in Table 2 ). The overhead incurred is mainly due to the extra pages that are loaded at the beginning of the sensitive code section.
RELATED WORK
Attacks on Enclaved Execution. Xu et al. have recently shown that the OS can use the page fault channel on applications running on SGX based systems to extract extract sensitive information [49] . The attacks are limited to general user programs such as image and text processing. On the contrary we study cryptographic implementations which is specific class of applications more relevant in the context of enclaves. More importantly, we show that the purported techniques discussed are not effective against pigeonhole attacks. As a new contribution, we propose and measure the effectiveness of concrete solutions to prevent against such attacks on cryptographic implementations. Our defense techniques can be applied to the applications discussed in [49] if they satisfy the conditions of balanced-execution tree. Side-channel Attacks. Yarom et al. study cache channel attacks wherein the adversary has the power to flush and reload the cache, which can be used to attacks elliptic curve cryptographic routines such as ECDSA [50, 51] . Recent study on caches has shown that even the last-level cache is vulnerable to side-channel attacks [34] . Timing and cache attacks have been used to by-pass kernel space ASLR [25] , VMs [26] , android applications [27] , cloud servers [54] and users [40] both locally and remotely [10] . Even web browsers can be exploited remotely via cache attacks on JavaScript [38] . Side-channel Detection & Defenses. Various detection mechanisms have been explored for side channels ranging from instruction level analysis to compiler techniques [11, 18, 52] . Tools such as CacheQuant can automatically quantify the bits of information leaked via cache side-channels [30] . Techniques such as input blinding, time bucketing are also available but are limited to specific algorithms [29, 31] . Side channel attacks in hypervisors, cloud VMs, kernel are mitigated using determinising strategies, controlflow independence and safe scheduling [6, 28, 37, 47, 55] . Our deterministic multiplexing defense is similar memory-trace obliviousness techniques proposed for secure computation [33, 48] . Randomization & Self-paging Defenses. ORAM techniques are widely used in secure computation and multi-party computations. Recent work demonstrate safe language, compiler techniques, and hypervisor based approaches which use ORAM. As discussed in Section 3.2, ORAM techniques are insufficient to alleviate pigeonhole attacks. On the other hand, self-paging assumes that the enclave will always have control over a fixed size [22] . In case that either party breaks this assumption, it opens a potential for DOS from enclave and pigeonholing from the OS and there is no fall back mechanism. Instead, bucketing assumes that the OS is benign, but in case of failure (un-expected page fault within a bucket) it enters the fall back mechanism and terminates without leaking any information. Thus, our techniques use a different strategy to side-step the limitations of these approaches.
CONCLUSIONS
We systematically study pigeonhole attack, a new threat prevalent in secure execution platforms such as SGX. By analyzing cryptographic implementation libraries, we demonstrate the severity of pigeonhole attacks. Our proposed defenses of deterministic multiplexing and contractual execution successfully defend enclaves against pigeonhole attacks. Both of them are practically deployable with acceptable overhead.
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